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At the 1985 summer meeting of the National Association of In-
surance Commissioners, commissioners from across the country
unanimously adopted a resolution in response to the increasing prob-
lem of indiscriminate cancellation of commercial liability insurance
policies.' The resolution called on the insurance industry to act
responsibly towards its consuming public and to cease the practice of
terminating whole books of business with little or no advance notice.
The call was not heeded; the problem continued unabated. When
change was not effected through voluntary efforts of the insurance
industry, it was imposed by the states. Regulations were adopted and
statutes enacted for the purpose of abating mass cancellations and
dealing with the market dislocation they caused. At the same time
efforts were made to find willing underwriters for the hard to place
commercial risks. This Article will describe steps taken in Pennsyl-
vania to relieve the pressure in the commercial insurance market
which in many ways serve as a paradigm of the national experience.
Before a response to the liability insurance crisis can be re-
viewed, the "crisis" itself must be identified. The crisis arose in com-
mercial property and casualty insurance. The personal lines, which
consist primarily of private passenger automobile insurance and
homeowners' insurance, were unaffected. Commercial property and
casualty insurance protects the policyholder against personal injury
and property damage claims of third parties as well as direct losses
to the policyholder. It includes such lines as workers' compensation,
medical malpractice, errors and omissions, product liability, munici-
pal liability and dram shop liability.2 The "crisis" consisted of mid-
term cancellation or non-renewal of an entire line of insurance with-
* B.A., Connecticut College; M.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., Dickinson School of
Law; formerly Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Insurance Department; Senior Associate, Baskin
Flaherty Elliott Mannino & Beren, Harrisburg, PA.
1. 1985 Proceedings of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, Vol. II, at
14-15 (1985) [hereinafter NAIC].
2. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 382 (Purdon 1971 & 1986).
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out explanation or advance warning given to the insured. Finding
replacement coverage was often impossible except by purchasing a
policy providing less protection at a significantly higher premium
level. In some cases, replacement coverage could not be found at any
price.
The problem was particularly acute for those businesses in
which liability insurance is mandated by statute. Taxicabs cannot be
granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public Utility
Commission,8 nor registered by the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation,4 without demonstrating proof of insurance. Health
care providers, including both physicians and hospitals, cannot be li-
censed5 without being insured. Enterprises as varied as theme parks,
carnivals, go-cart trackways6 and pesticide applicators7 cannot oper-
ate without demonstrating financial responsibility to the governmen-
tal agency charged with the duty to license them. Even where stat-
utes do not require liability insurance, prudent business management
and the realities of the commercial marketplace often make it a
necessity.
In short, the unavailability of commercial property and casualty
insurance placed Pennsylvania businesses, governmental units and
quasi-public operations, such as day care centers, in a dangerous po-
sition. While some businesses and municipalities made the decision
to "go bare," others simply closed their doors.8
The periodic literature abounds with analyses of the causes of
this crisis.9 Cyclical changes in the economy have always affected
3. Pennsylvania Utility Commission regulations require motor carriers of property and
passengers to file a certificate of insurance from an authorized insurer evidencing sufficient
coverage for bodily injury and property damage claims. 52 PA. CODE §§ 29.104(d), 31.6(c)
and 31.44.
4. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1305(a), 1306, 1309, 1781-1787 (Purdon 1977).
5. Health Care Services Malpractice Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.701 (Purdon
Supp. 1986).
6. Amusement Ride Inspection Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 414 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
7. Pennsylvania Pesticide Control Act, PA STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 111.39 (Purdon Supp.
1986).
8. Andresky, A World Without Insurance?, 136 FORBES 40 (July 1985); Szabo, No Re-
lief from the Liability Crisis, 74 NATION'S Bus. 69-70 (Oct. 1986); Farrell & Ehrlich, Now
Even Insurers Have a Hard Time Getting Coverage, Bus. WEEK 128-29 (Dec. 2, 1985); Le-
Roux, Liability Insurers are Abandoning Day Care Centers across the U.S., 19 Bus. INS. 2
(June 1985); Fletcher, Public Entity Dilemma: Go Bare or Bust, 19 Bus. INS. I (July 1985);
Gatty, Experts see no Quick Solutions to Insurance Crisis, 201 HOTEL & MOTEL MGMT. I I
(Mar. 1986); Weiker, Jr., The Liability Insurance Crisis: Its Impact on Small Business, 161
J. AccT. 66-67 (May 1986).
9. See, e.g., Powell, Sorting Out the Liability Debate, 107 NEWSWEEK 60-61 (May 12,
1986); Sherrill, One Paper That Wouldn't Shut Up: Charleston Gazette's Coverage of the
Liability Insurance 'Crisis', 242 NATION 688-91 (May 17, 1986); Brody, Litigation and Insur-
ance: When Products Turn Into Liabilities, 248 CURRENT 8-11 (July 1986); The Guilty Par-
INSURANCE CRISIS
commercial liability insurance. Historically, property and casualty
insurers derived their profits from investment income earned on pre-
miums collected, not from underwriting.10 When the prime interest
rate reached a high of 21.5% in 1981, the commercial insurance in-
dustry enjoyed a very profitable investment experience. In such a cy-
cle, insurers sought to attract premuim income by writing liability
policies at rates so low as to guarantee an underwriting loss.11 For
several years, businesses actually saw a decline in their insurance
premium notwithstanding a high inflation rate. Insurers minimized
their risks by obtaining reinsurance.1 2 When the inflation rate fell,
underwriting losses rose faster than investment income and the in-
surance companies were caught short. At the same time, foreign
reinsurers withdrew from the market leaving American insurers to
handle the losses.1" In 1984, underwriting losses exceeded investment
income, and insurers suffered an overall pre-tax loss of $3.8 billion.
In 1985, those losses increased.1"
While management practices of the insurance industry are
targeted, responsibility for the liability insurance crisis is also laid at
the feet of the tort law system. This latter assignment is hotly con-
tested by the trial bar as well as by such well-known consumer advo-
cates as Ralph Nader.15 Since the purpose of commercial liability
insurance is to provide protection against tort claims there is a nexus
between problems in the liability insurance marketplace and the tort
system. At the very least, the tort system affects the cost of commer-
ties in the Great Liability Insurance Crisis, 298 ECONOMIST, 23-4 (Mar. 1986); McIntyre,
Crisis not Solely Caused by Rate Cuts, 20 Bus. INS. 76 (Apr. 1986).
10. Venezian, Ratemaking Methods and Profit Cycles in Property and Liability Insur-
ance, 52 J. RISK & INs. 477 (Sept. 1985); Church, Sorry, America, Your Policy is Cancelled,
127 TIME 16 (Mar. 24, 1986).
II. See Church, supra note 10.
12. A reinsurance treaty is an indemnity contract between a primary insurer and a rein-
surer who in turn may purchase reinsurance. No rights are conferred upon the insured whose
policy is subject to a reinsurance treaty. See 19 CoucH ON INSURANCE 2d §§ 80:1-80:78.
Reinsurance is subject only to limited regulation in Pennsylvania as in most states. See PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 319-319.2, 442-442.2 (Supp. 1986). Insurers licensed or authorized to
do business in Pennsylvania may not cede a risk to a reinsurer unless the reinsurer meets
solvency standards, and the ceding company will not reserve a credit on its financial statement
unless the reinsurer is on a list of qualified reinsurers published by the Insurance
Commissioner.
13. Miller & King, U.S. Lawsuits Have Lloyd's Taking a Bath, Bus. WEEK 39-40 (May
27, 1985); Farrell & Ehrlich, supra note 8; Mclntrye & Shapiro, Claims-made Forms Won't
Ease All Worries of Foreign Reinsurers, 19 Bus. INS. 49 (Sept. 23, 1985); Collins, Reinsur-
ance Crunch Real. Experts Agree, 19 Bus. INS. 50-1 (Sept. 30, 1985).
14. See Church, supra note 10, at 25.
15. Charges by NICO, Nader Raise Industry's Hackles: Manufactured Liability Insur-
ance Crisis to Change State Tort Laws and Win Premium Increases, 86 BEST'S REV. - PROP-
ERTY/CASUALTY INSURANCE ED. 5-6 (Oct. 1985); Litigious America, 298 ECONOMIST 16-17,
(Mar. 1986); Hunter & Borziller, Liability Insurance Crisis, 22 TRIAL 42 (Apr. 1986).
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cial liability insurance. Further, the European reinsurance market
perceives the American civil justice system as unpredictable, thereby
impeding the ability of the reinsurer to evalute the risk. 6 That per-
ception affects the willingness of reinsurers to underwrite American
risks.
The liability insurance crisis produced a flurry of state and fed-
eral activity. The response included diverse regulatory actions and
legislative programs ranging from approval of the general commer-
cial claims-made policy,' 7 tort reform, 18 changes in rate regulation 9
and even repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act;20 all of these may
be attributed to the liability insurance crisis. This Article will focus
only on those state and federal laws which are designed expressly to
ease the problems caused by the unavailability of commercial liabil-
ity insurance. Those laws have focused on two themes: limiting the
ability of insurers to terminate coverage and establishing new
sources of insurance protection.
16. At the June 1985 opening session of the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners, Peter Miller, Chairman of Lloyd's of London, gave the keynote address. He criticized
the American property and casualty insurance industry for not doing the underwriting that
was necessary to a stable and solvent market. He also blamed, in part, the capacity shortage
upon the civil justice system for which he urged reform. NAIC, supra note I, at 5-9. Miller's
perception of the civil justice system has not altered. In a recent article, Miller described the
American tort system as a "national lottery fraught with uncertainties that make sensible
pricing of the insurance product virtually impossible." Lloyd's Points Finger at U.S. For 'Pan-
dora's Box', J. COM. (Nov. II, 1986).
17. E. Hook, Occurrence v. Claims-made CGL: Will there really be a Choice?, 32 RISK
MGMT. 58-9, (June 1985); Training Aids Help Explain ISO CGL Policies, 89 NAT'L UNDER-
WRITER - PROPERTY CASUALTY INSURANCE ED. 29 (Aug. 1985); C. Cain, Regulators Spell
Out Changes They Want In Claims-made Form, 19 BUS. INS. I (Oct. 28, 1985); Hendrick &
Wiezal, The New Commercial General Liability Forms - An Introduction and Critique, 36
FICC Q. 319-68 (1986).
18. See 1986 State Tort Reform Provisions - A Capsulation, 29 FOR DEF. 6-7 (Jan.
1987).
19. In Pennsylvania, commercial liability insurance rates are subject to prior review and
approval. See Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1 181-1199
(Purdon 1971). Workers' compensation insurance rates are also regulated. See Insurance
Company Law of 1921, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 814 (Purdon 1971). In many states, commer-
cial insurance rates are subject to after-the-fact regulation; these laws are known as "file and
use" rate laws. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 737.205 (1985). In 1986, Oregon adopted a "band-
ing rule" requiring insurers to obtain approval of changes in premium that exceeded 25%,
either up or down.
20. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), the
Supreme Court reversed an earlier ruling and held, for the first time, that insurance is part of
interstate commerce and thus subject to regulation by Congress. In 1945, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act to re-establish that states would have the right to regulate the busi-
ness of insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1984 & Supp. 1986). Except for acts of boycott,
coercion, or intimidation, insurance is exempt from federal anti-trust laws so long as it is
regulated effectively by the states. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1012, 1013 (1984 & Supp. 1986). In the wake
of the liability insurance crisis, a repeal of McCarran-Ferguson has been proposed by Senator
Paul Simon (D.-Ill.); the repeal is known as the "Insurance Competition Act of 1986" (S.
2458).
INSURANCE CRISIS
II. Regulation of Policy Terminations
In Pennsylvania, the state government undertook progressive
steps to curb the phenomenon of wide-spread policy cancellations
and non-renewals. On August 9, 1985, the Insurance Commissioner
sent a letter to each insurance company authorized to do business in
Pennsylvania advising it to refrain from indiscriminate midterm can-
cellation of whole classes of commercial property and casualty insur-
ance business. The Insurance Department found that while midterm
cancellations were somewhat abated, problems continued requiring
the adoption of a regulation in March 1986. Subsequently, the state
legislature replaced the regulation with a statute containing most of
the regulation's features. In October 1986, the process came full cir-
cle when the Insurance Department proposed a regulation imple-
menting the statute. The essence of the Pennsylvania statute and
regulation was to limit the grounds for cancellation and to set forth
standards for the proper execution of a company's decision to cancel
or to non-renew coverage.
A. Regulation at 31 Pa. Code Chapter 113, Subchapter F
1. Emergency Adoption of the Regulation.-In order to be-
come effective, regulations must pass over the shoals presented by
the Commonwealth Documents Law21 and the Regulatory Review
Act.22 Under the Commonwealth Documents Law, notice of pro-
posed rulemaking must be published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin,
allowing interested members of the public thirty days to submit com-
ments. 23 Thereafter, the agency may publish notice of the regula-
tion's final adoption.2' The Regulatory Review Act established stan-
dards for regulations2" and created the Independent Regulatory
Review Commission2 to enforce those standards. This Commission
reviews regulatory proposals, receives input from the legislature, and
possesses authority to enter an order barring the agency from adopt-
ing a proposal as a final regulation. Both statutes provide for more
expeditious adoption of regulations where circumstances require it.
Under sections 203 and 204 of the Commonwealth Documents
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, § 1102-1208 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
22. Act of June 25, 1982, P.L. 633, as amended, Act of February 21, 1986, P.L. -,
to be codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.1-.15.
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1201, 1203 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
24. Id.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.5(d), (e) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
26. Id. at § 745.4.
27. Id. at § 745.6.
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Law,28 an agency may omit notice of proposed rulemaking and adopt
a regulation with an immediate effective date where to do otherwise
would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public."29
Similarly, the Independent Regulatory Review Commission may not
enter an order barring publication of a final order adopting a regula-
tion where it is certified by the Governor that the regulation is re-
quired to meet an emergency." Where a regulation is so certified, it
can remain in effect for 120 days after which it may be suspended
by the Commission."
The Insurance Department's regulation to limit midterm cancel-
lation and non-renewals of commercial liability policies became ef-
fective on March 17, 1986, prior to its first publication in the Penn-
sylvania Bulletin.82 Under 1 Pennsylvania Code section 13.74, a
regulation may take effect even prior to publication where it is im-
practical and contrary to the public notice to defer the effective date.
Each affected company received actual notice of the regulation
through a mailing sent on March 14, 1986. The notice consisted of a
letter explaining the purpose, significance, and requirements of the
regulation, as well as a copy of the regulation itself.33 Because of the
peril in which the policyholder is placed by cancellation or non-re-
newal that is accompanied by little advance notice, the Insurance
Department found that immediate remedial action was required to
forestall a crisis. In addition, the department feared that advance
notice of the regulation could itself trigger a wave of terminations by
insurers in order to avoid compliance with the regulation. The Gov-
ernor certified to the Independent Regulatory Review Commission
that immediate adoption of the regulation was necessary. 4
On April 16, 1986, the emergency regulation was deemed ap-
proved by the Independent Regulatory Review Commission.3 5 Ac-
cordingly, the emergency regulation was able to remain in effect be-
yond the 120 days authorized by the Regulatory Review Act. 6
2. Content of the Regulation.-The Pennsylvania Insurance
Department adopted subchapter F of Chapter 113 of Title 31 of the
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 45, §§ 1203, 1204 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
29. Id. at § 1204.
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.6(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
31. Id.
32. See 16 PA. BULL. 952 (1986).
33. Id. at 952-53.
34. Id. at 953. The Governor's emergency certification is on deposit with the Legislative
Reference Bureau.
35. See 16 PA. BULL. 4167 (1986).
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 745.6(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
INSURANCE CRISIS
Pennsylvania Code ("Subchapter F") to limit the ability of insurers
to cancel commercial policies midterm and to establish new con-
sumer protections in the non-renewal of such policies. The grounds
for cancellation were limited to situations where the insurer had lost
its reinsurance,37 the insured had made a material misrepresentation
or fraudulent statement on the application, 8 the insured had failed
to pay the premium in a timely fashion,s" or where some "condition,
factor or loss experience material to the insurability [of the individ-
ual risk] has changed during the policy term. ' 40 In addition, the reg-
ulation created a cancellation safe harbor, to wit, "another reason
approved by the Insurance Commissioner."' 1 Subchapter F estab-
lished no express limitations on the grounds that an insurer could use
to justify a non-renewal.
Rules governing the execution of a cancellation and non-renewal
were also established. Written notice had to be forwarded by first-
class mail to the named insured at least sixty days in advance of the
effective date of the cancellation or non-renewal. 42 Where the can-
cellation was caused by a material misrepresentation of non-payment
of premium, the requirement of advance notice was contracted to
fifteen days,' 3 and where the insured's fraudulent statement
prompted the cancellation, notice could be given simultaneous with
the effective date of the cancellation.4
The regulation specified the content and format of the written
notice of non-renewal or cancellation. The notice itself. had to be
clearly labeled as a "notice of cancellation" or "notice of non-re-
newal."' 5 The insurer was obliged to give a description of the reason
that led to the termination decision that was sufficiently detailed to
allow the insured to correct the deficiency which caused the termina-
tion.' 8 In addition, the insurer had to give notice to the insured of his
right to request loss information for the three years prior to termina-
tion.47 The Insurance Department deemed this loss information nec-
essary in order to enhance the insured's ability to obtain replacement
coverage.
37. 31 PA. CODE § 13.71(1)(ii) (1986).
38. 31 PA. CODE § 113.71(I)(iii) and (iv) (1986).
39. 31 PA. CODE § l13.71(l)(v) (1986).
40. 31 PA. CODE § 1I3.71(I)(i) (1986).
41. 31 PA. CODE § 113.71(I)(vi) (1986).
42. 31 PA. CODE §§ 113.71(2), 113.74(l) (1986).
43. 31 PA. CODE § 113.71(2)(i) and (iii) (1986).
44. 31 PA. CODE § 13.71(2)(ii) (1986).
45. 31 PA. CODE § 113.74(2) (1986).
46. 31 PA. CODE § 113.74(3) (1986).
47. 31 PA. CODE § 113.74(4) (1986).
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Subchapter F established two consumer protections ancillary to
the termination of a commercial insurance policy. Under the first,
insureds were guaranteed prompt refund of unearned premiums if
the policy was cancelled. Insurers were required to refund the pre-
mium within ten days of termination when cancellation was initiated
by the insurer and within thirty days when cancellation was initiated
by the insured."8 This refund was necessary to permit the insured to
purchase replacement coverage; the premium on commercial cover-
age can be several thousand dollars even for a small enterprise. 9
The second protection pertained to the termination of a claims-made
policy." Insurers were obligated to give insureds sixty days in which
to purchase an extended reporting endorsement or tail coverage.
5 1
Such an endorsement provides the insured with coverage for inci-
dents taking place during the policy period but not yet reported.
The regulation applied to all entities with insurance business in
Pennsylvania, including licensed carriers and surplus lines carriers.5
The surplus lines insurer, while not licensed, may do business in
Pennsylvania so long as it has found a place on the list of eligible
surplus lines insurers. 8 The sanction for non-compliance with Sub-
chapter F was continuation of the insured's coverage until such time
as the proper notice of cancellation or non-renewal were given. 4 Be-
cause the regulation took immediate effect, a sixty day statewide
moratorium on all policy terminations resulted. Notices sent out
prior to the publication of Subchapter F were ineffective since it was
impossible for them to have complied with the form and content re-
quirements for notices established in the regulation. Insurers were
thereby required to send out new conforming notices which could not
be effective in less than sixty days.
3. Authority for the Regulation.-Insurers chose to follow the
terms of Subchapter F rather than to challenge their validity. Never-
theless, certain insurers filed objections with the Independent Regu-
latory Review Commission charging that the Insurance Department
lacked the authority to adopt the regulation and that the regulation
was an unconstitutional impairment of contract. An analysis of those
questions is, therefore, appropriate. The regulation was promulgated
48. 31 PA. CODE § 113.71(3) and (4) (1986).
49. See Church, supra note 10, at 17-20.
50. See supra note 17.
51. 31 PA. CODE § 113.71(6) (1986).
52. 31 PA. CODE § 113.72(a) (1986).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1006.7 (Purdon 1971 & 1986).
54. 31 PA. CODE § 113.75 (1986).
INSURANCE CRISIS
under section 354 of the Insurance Company Law of 192155 and sec-
tion 4 of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act.5" It is a fundamental
requirement that an administrative agency have the statutory au-
thority to promulgate a regulation. 7
a. Section 354 of the Insurance Company Law of 1921.-Sec-
tion 354 of the Insurance Company Law of 1921 requires approval
of all insurance policies prior to their use in Pennsylvania and grants
the Insurance Commissioner broad discretion in reviewing poposed
policies. That discretion has been described as "quasi-judicial
power" to determine whether or not the policy violates any law or
principle of equity.58 As noted by the Pennsylvania Attorney General
in a formal opinion, one of the goals of the Commissioner's review of
insurance contracts is to ensure that the contract is consistent with
sound public policy. 9 This broad grant of authority to the Commis-
sioner is necessary because insurance contracts are contracts of ad-
hesion. 60 The authority to give approval includes the power to with-
draw approval of contract provisions that have previously been
approved.6
Policy forms previously approved for use by insurers issuing
commercial property and casualty insurance did not have standard
provisions relating to cancellation or non-renewal. Some policies pro-
vided for 120 days notice of cancellation while others provided for
only 5 days. Policy forms contained no fixed time period or require-
ments relating to notice of non-renewal.6"
The Insurance Department found that insurers exceeded their
rights under the cancellation provisions in their commercial policies
by using them for purposes which were never intended and never
approved by the Insurance Commissioner. The cancellation provision
was intended for use when the insurance company had compelling
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 477(b) (Purdon 1971).
56. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.4 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
57. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Insurance Dep't of Pa., 29 Pa.
Commw. 459, 371 A.2d 564 (1977), arfd per curiam, 482 Pa. 330, 393 A.2d 1131 (1978).
58. See Official Opinion No. 22 of the Pennsylvania Attorney General 1974, quoted with
approval in INA Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dept. of Pa., 31 Pa. Commw. 416, 419, 376 A.2d
670, 672 (1977).
59. See Official Opinion No. 22, supra note 58, at 75; see also, Mutual Benefit Life Ins.
Co. v. Welsh, 71 Olka. 59, 175 P. 45 (1918).
60. See Miller v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 70 Pa. D.&C.2d 338 (1975); Trakman, Adhesion
Contracts and the Law of Insurance, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 23 (1983).
61. See Physicians Mutual Ins. Co. v. Denenberg, 15 Pa. Commw. Ct. 509, 327 A.2d
415 (1974).
62. Letter of April I, 1986, from Insurance Commissioner George F. Grode to Irvin
Zimmerman, Chairman of the Independent Regulatory Review Commission.
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reasons to terminate a policy with a specific insured. Instead, insur-
ers used the cancellation provision to terminate whole classes of risks
or lines of insurance. Insureds were denied the benefit of the bargain
of their contract not because of their acts or omissions but because
of their insurance company's management decisions. Because of the
misuse of the cancellation provision, the Insurance Commissioner
withdrew approval of already existing cancellation provisions
through the regulation.
Jarvis v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,63 a 1982
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, established that insurance
companies have a duty to notify insureds of their intention not to
offer a policy renewal. At issue in the Jarvis case was a workmen's
compensation insurance policy, which is a type of commercial prop-
erty and casualty insurance. The court held that an insurance com-
pany has a duty to give policyholders advance notice where the in-
surer does not intend to renew coverage. When this duty is breached,
the policy continues in force and does not expire. The Insurance De-
partment determined that the insurers had failed to meet this duty
by non-renewing coverage without advance notice. In some cases, in-
surers informed the policyholder's agent, who did not relay the infor-
mation to the insured. In other cases, insurers provided notice of
non-renewal, but only days before the effective date.
Section 354 of the Insurance Company Law of 1921 provided
the authority necessary to require insurers to amend their policy
forms to guarantee sixty days advance notice of cancellation and
non-renewals. In short, Subchapter F was an exercise of the insur-
ance Commissioner's power to ensure that insurance contracts both
conform to case law regarding those contracts and are fair to the
public."'
b. Section 4 of the Unfair Insurance Practices
Act.-Subchapter F not only required amendment of policies to be
used in the future, it also applied to policies in force. Statutes grant
the Insurance Department the authority and duty to regulate trade
practices, and it was by exercise of this authority that the policies in
force were placed under the requirements of Subchapter F.
Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act65 in order to pre-
serve the system of state regulation of the insurance industry. Mc-
63. 497 Pa. 379, 441 A.2d 1189 (1982).
64. See Pennsylvania Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Insurance Dep't of Pa., 29 Pa.
Commw. 549, 371 A.2d 564 (1977).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq. (1984).
INSURANCE CRISIS
Carran-Ferguson immunized insurance companies from federal anti-
trust liability to the extent that states enacted statutes that would
regulate at least as effectively as the Federal Trade Commission Act
("FTCA").6 In Pennsylvania, that act is the Unfair Insurance Prac-
tices Act' 7 which was first enacted in 1947 and is modeled on the
FTCA.
The stated purpose of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act is "to
regulate trade practices in the business of insurance . . . by defining
or providing for the determination of all such practices . . . which
constitute unfair methods of competition ...or acts of practices
and by prohibiting the trade practices so defined or determined."6
Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act thus mimics the
FTCA's two prong attack on unfair trade practices: by definition and
by determination." The General Assembly defined numerous unfair
trade practices that are listed in section 5 of the Act. 0 In addition,
the legislature conferred upon the Insurance Commissioner the
power to determine additional unfair trade practices not specified in
section 5. The authority to make these determinations is found in
section 4 of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act."'
The trade practices that prompted the adoption of Subchapter
F72 were the uniform abuse by insurance companies of their author-
ity to cancel commercial policies and their widespread failure to give
notice of non-renewal with sufficient lead time to permit persons to
obtain replacement coverage. These abuses are not contained in the
list of defined unfair trade practices in section 5 of the Unfair Insur-
ance Practices Act, and could be curbed only by exercise of the In-
surance Commissioner's power under section 4 to determine addi-
tional unfair trade practices. The General Assembly did not dictate
the manner by which the Insurance Commissioner should make
these determinations. Case law has established that the Insurance
Commissioner has implied authority to promulgate regulations under
66. 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1975).
67. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171,1-.15 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
69. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 64, 68a, 69a, 70a (1975).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.4 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
72. There is little doubt that Subchapter F was an exercise in regulation of "trade prac-
tices in the business of insurance." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1141.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986). In
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that
"[tihe relationship between the insurer and the insured, the type of policy which could be
issued, its reliability, its interpretation and enforcement - these were the core of the 'business
of insurance.'"
91 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SUMMER 1987
the Unfair Insurance Practices Act."' The statute authorizes adjudi-
catory proceedings. 4 Accordingly, the Insurance Commissioner had
the authority to identify and prohibit practices determined unfair ei-
ther by adjudication or by regulation.
It is a basic tenet of administrative law that an agency may
establish new law either by exercise of its quasi-legislative rulemak-
ing power or by exercise of its quasi-judicial power.7 An agency's
decision to make law by regulation rather than by adjudication can
be reversed only where a clear abuse of discretion can be demon-
strated.7 6 In this case, the Insurance Department exercised its discre-
tion to determine unfair trade practices in the area of policy termi-
nations by regulation rather than by adjudication. Rulemaking
assured that one company of the seven hundred authorized to write
commercial property and casualty insurance was not singled out for
enforcement proceedings. It also assured that the commercial insur-
ance industry remained on an equal competitive footing with respect
to regulation. Further, rulemaking was consistent with the methods
followed in other states that chose to take action under their unfair
trade practices act to regulate the termination of commercial liabil-
ity insurance. 7
c. Impairment of contract.-In order to claim the impairment
of a contract, the contract right itself must be established.7 8 In this
case, the Insurance Department determined that insurers had no
right to use the cancellation provision in their policy forms to termi-
nate whole lines of business in the middle of the contract term. The
cancellation provision was approved for use only where the insurer
had a need to terminate an individual policy for reasons relating to
that specific risk.
Even if insurers did have a contract right to cancel policies on a
whim, Subchapter F satisfied tests developed to analyze whether a
state regulation will be permitted in light of its impact upon contrac-
73. See Pennsylvania Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Insurance Dept of Pa., 24 Pa.
Commw. 459, 371 A.2d 564 (1977).
74. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.7-1171.9 (Supp. 1986) provide for the determination
of unfair insurance practices acts by adjudication.
75. 2 DAVIs ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7:25 (2d ed. 1975).
76. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 293 (1974); Patel v. Immigration
and Naturalization Serv., 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980).
77. See. e.g., MONT. ADMIN. REG. 6.6.2001-.2010 (19 ); N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. I I §§ 1-
20 (1986); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 3901-1-45 (1986); OR. ADMIN. R. 836-85-001 to 045 (19 ).
78. See Energy Reserves v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), for a
definitve treatment of impairment of contract.
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tual obligations.79 Courts will not even consider such a challenge un-
less the impairment can be shown to be substantial. In this case,
giving advance notice of cancellation or non-renewal does not mark a
substantial change in the contractual relationship. Even so, the
state's exercise of its regulatory power is authorized where, as here,
it ii necessary to promote the public health and safety. 80 The regula-
tion was tailored to meet the existing emergency; it was reasonable
in its terms; and it was directed at an already highly regulated
industry.
Although many states promulgated rules and regulations8 to
limit cancellations and non-renewals, only New Jersey's generated
litigation. The regulation adopted by the New Jersey Insurance De-
partment not only limited policy terminations, but also price in-
creases.8 2 An association of insurers claimed, inter alia, that the im-
mediate effect of the emergency regulation unconstitutionally
impaired their insurance contracts. The Superior Court of New
Jersey upheld the regulation as valid and constitutional.83
B. Act 86 of 1986.
On July 3, 1986, a statutory version of Subchapter F went into
effect.84 Act 86-1986 provided the same substantive protections as
those afforded under the regulation and established additional con-
sumer protections. One new feature was the requirement that insur-
ance companies give notice of intent to increase premiums, as well as
an estimate of the increase. 86 Other provisions in the statute were of
a housekeeping type, which clarified certain provisions that had ap-
peared in Subchapter F. These included directions on how an insurer
was to refund unearned premiums when the premium was deter-
mined on an estimated basis or on the basis of a payroll audit.88 In
addition, the statute provided the sanction of civil penalties to be
imposed by the Insurance Commissioner against insurers who failed
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., DePaul v. Kauffman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971).
81. See supra note 77.
82. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. II § 1-20.3 (1986).
83. In the Matter of N.J.A.C. 11:1-20, 208 N.J. Super. 182, 505 A.2d 177 (1986).
84. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 3401-09 (Purdon Supp. 1987). Other states saw their
cancellation regulations converted to statute by their state legislatures. See, e.g. Ky. REV.
STAT. §§ 304.20-300 to 304.20-350 (1986). No attempt is made in this Article to list and
compare all statutes and regulations relating to termination of commercial property and casu-
alty insurance terminations because their enactment and amendment is so current.
85. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 3401 (Purdons Supp. 1987).
86. Id. at § 3404.
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to comply with the provisions of the act.87 The statute did, however,
give insurers an additional ground for cancellation, namely, "mate-
rial failure to comply with policy terms, conditions or contractual
duties." 88
C. Implementing Regulations for Act 86
On October 25, 1986, notice of proposed rulemaking appeared
in the Pennsylvania Bulletin amending Subchapter F of Chapter
113.8' These amendments deleted those sections of the regulation
that were superseded by the provisions of Act 86-1986. The amend-
ments also set forth new procedures necessary to clarify certain pro-
visions of the enactment.
The amendments to Chapter 113 specify how notice of an esti-
mated premium increase will be accomplished,9 ° set forth the proce-
dure for certifying loss or substantial decrease of reinsurance, 9' es-
tablish compliance procedures for surplus lines insurers with respect
to the notice requirements and the return of unearned premium. " In
addition, the regulation deals specifically with how an insurer may
terminate a commercial property and casualty risk where that risk
failed to comply with safety standards and loss control recommenda-
tions of the insurer. 93 The amendments to Chapter 113 were deemed
approved by the House and Senate Committees on November 14,
1986, and approved by the Independent Regulatory Review Com-
mission on November 24, 1986.'" Its final adoption was published in
the Pennsylvania Bulletin on February 7, 1987.
D. Pitfalls in the Termination of Commercial Insurance Policies
Act 86-1986 differs from statutes regulating the termination of
personal lines such as homeowners' insurance ("Act 205")95 or auto-
mobile insurance ("Act 78"). 9" Those acts provide insureds a private
cause of action to enforce the terms of the statute. Under both acts,
87. Id. at 9 3408.
88. Id. at 9 3402(7).
89. 16 PA. BULL. 4166 (1986).
90. 16 PA. BULL. 4170 (1986), 31 PA. CODE § 113.83 (1987).
91. Id., 31 PA. CODE § 113.84 (1987).
92. Id. at 4170-71, 31 PA. CODE § 113.86 (1987).
93. Id. at 4170, 31 PA. CODE § 113.85 (1987).
94. 17 PA. BULL. 3652-53 (1987).
95. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1171.1-.15 (Purdon Supp. 1986); known as "Unfair Insur-
ance Practices Act," 1974 Pa. Laws 205.
96. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1008.1-. Il (Purdon 1971); known as "Act of June 5,
1968," 1968 Pa. Laws 78.
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insureds have the right to demand that the Insurance Department
investigate whether their policy was properly terminated. 97 If the in-
sured disagrees with the conclusion of the Insurance Department,
the insured has a right to an administrative hearing and thereafter
an appeal to commonwealth court." There is no private cause of ac-
tion granted to insureds under Act 86-1986.
The Insurance Department receives complaints from consumers
who believe their policies were improperly terminated. If the Depart-
ment determines that a violation occurred, the insurer is so informed
and directed to take corrective steps. An insurer who refuses to com-
ply with that directive will be subject to enforcement action."9 If the
Insurance Department finds that the insurer has not violated Act 86-
1986, the insured does not have the right to obtain a formal adminis-
trative hearing to review that conclusion. °10
Under Act 86-1986, a policy continues in effect when the insur-
ance company has failed to give prior notice of the non-renewal or
cancellation in a manner consistent with statute. 01 This means that
if an insurance company fails to give proper notice of a non-renewal,
it may be required to remain on the policy for a successive policy
term.102 The only way the insurance company may get off the risk
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § I171.5(c)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 1008.8 (Purdon 1971).
98. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1008.9 (Purdon 1971).
99. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 3408 (Purdon Supp. 1987), which grants authority to
the Insurance Commissioner to order remedial action by insurers in violation of the Act. The
Act gives no special authority to insureds to demand an investigation or to obtain review of a
staff decision that the insurer has not violated the Act. Cf. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1008.8
(Purdon 1971) (permits insureds this review in the case where an automobile insurance policy
is terminated). In D'Ambrosio v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Co., 494 Pa. 501, 431
A.2d 966 (1981), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted a provision of the Unfair Insur-
ance Practices Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.9 (Purdon Supp. 1986), to mean that in-
sureds had no private right of action. In short, enforcement of the new section 3408 is depen-
dent upon the Insurance Department.
100. A well established jurisprudential principle holds that the power to prosecute in-
volves broad discretion which is not ordinarily subject to judicial review. Heckler, Sec'y of
Health and Human Services v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). Accordingly, no matter how
strong the evidence presented by the complaining party, the law provides no remedy for even a
capricious refusal to institute proceedings. See POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 10
(1930); Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1078 (1955). The doctrine of
prosecutorial discretion has been expanded to include administrative agencies. As pointed out
by Professor Davis, the concept of "enforcement" is broad and includes the activities of regula-
tors as well as prosecutors. It allows a public officer the discretion not to enforce a law even
where the statute states that the officer "shall" or "must" enforce or that he has a "duty" to
enforce. DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9:1, at 217 (2d ed. 1978). In some cir-
cumstances, an agency's dismissal of a complaint may be reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Pennsylvania Social Serv. Union Local 668 v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 27 Pa.
Commw. 552, 367 A.2d 778 (1976).
101. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 3403(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987).
102. The implementing regulation defines "non-renewal" and "renewal." 31 PA. CODE
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earlier is if it has grounds to cancel the policy because of loss of
reinsurance or the failure of the insured to pay premium or other-
wise to comply with the material terms of the policy.10 3
Because the statute continues coverage where the insurer does
not properly execute a termination, the insurer may find itself obli-
gated to make payment on claims long after it believes the policy to
be terminated.0 4 Ironically, the statute may provide an incentive to
the insured not to object upon receiving a termination notice it
knows to be defective under Act 86-1986.
In some instances, it is difficult to shoehorn the realities of the
insurance business with the requirements of the statute. For exam-
ple, the statute requires advance notice of premium increase as well
as advance notice of non-renewal. 05 Policies covered by the regula-
tion include those issued to public agencies such as municipalities
and school districts which typically obtain their insurance through a
bid process. In some instances, the bid requirements may be such
that the bid may not even be submitted to the insured within the
time required by Act 86-1986 for giving advance notice of premium
increase. The only way for the insurer to protect itself is to give ad-
vance notice of non-renewal and recite as the reason for non-renewal
the fact that the policy will terminate under the specifications of the
bid itself.
In Pennsylvania, commercial insurance rates are subject to prior
review and approval.'0 6 In some instances, giving advance notice of
the premium increase will require nothing more than giving notice to
the insured of the percentage of the most recent rate increase. Com-
mercial insurance, however, is often rated on the basis of experience
of the risk or on the basis of the payroll of the insured's business
enterprise. Thus, the premium is not finally determined until an au-
dit has been done of the insured. 07 The matter is even further com-
plicated by the fact that, in many instances, it is the agent that
§§ 113.81, 113.86 (1987); 16 PA. BULL. 4169, 4171 (1986). Sixty days advance notice of non-
renewal must be given; if that date is missed, the insurer must renew.
103. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 3402(2)-(8) (Purdon Supp. 1987); see also 31 PA.
CODE §§ 113.84, .85 (1987); 16 PA. BULL. 4170 (1986).
104. See, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 3403(b) (Purdon Supp. 1987), which continues cov-
erage until a complying notice is sent to the insured or until the insured obtains replacement
coverage.
105. Id. § 3401.
106. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1182, 1184 (Purdon 1971); see also id. § 814. The
rates of surplus lines insurers are not subject to prior approval; however, they may not be lower
than the lowest rate approved for a licensed carrier. Id. § 1006.4(a)(3).
107. See id. § 3401. See also 31 PA. CODE §§ 113.82, .83 (1987); 16 PA. BULL. 4169,
4169-70 (1986).
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"owns" the business and, thus, has all the information necessary to
establish the renewal premium. It is the agent that is constantly
looking for the best deal for his insured and will place his insured
with a different insurer depending on the amount of the premium. At
the same time, it may be difficult for the insurance company to ar-
range the audit necessary where the insured's agent is not
cooperative.
As experience is gained under Act 86, the industry will learn to
adjust is business procedures to conform with the statutory require-
ment. 108 Further amendments to Chapter 113 can be expected as
experience is derived under the program and additional information
is acquired from the other states with similar programs.
III. Improving the Availability of Liability Insurance Protection
The purchase of a liability insurance policy from a property and
casualty insurer is not the only means by which to provide for the
defense against and payment of liability judgments. A self-insurance
program achieves the same result although care must be taken to
ensure that mandatory insurance statutes are satisfied. 10 9 Self-insur-
ance is only realistic for the large business enterprise or government;
small businesses rarely have the financial resources to establish a
self-insurance program. Other mechanisms, including a risk reten-
tion group, a pool or a captive insurance company, can also be used
to provide insurance which may be more attractive to small busi-
nesses. Alternate insurance mechanisms are not the only way to ob-
tain relief in a tight market. Statutes have been passed and volun-
tary efforts undertaken to provide relief by bringing the consumer
and the insurer together in the traditional contractual relationship.
A. Market Assistance Program
In 1985, a market assistance program ("MAP") was established
in Pennsylvania to assist applicants in finding liability insurance with
a commercial insurance carrier.110 The Pennsylvania MAP is a vol-
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 3401 (Purdon Supp. 1987), 31 PA. CODE §§ 113.82, .83
(1987); 16 PA. BULL. 4169, 4170 (1986).
109. For example, self-insurance can be an acceptable method by which to provide fi-
nancial responsibility on motor vehicles. If the self-insurance program is approved by the De-
partment of Transportation, registration will be granted. 75 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 1787 (Purdon
Supp. 1986); 67 PA. CODE §§ 223.1-.7 (1986).
110. The Pennsylvania Market Assistance Program is located in Suite 1100, Robert
Morris Building, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103. It has published a brochure describing its
goals and operations from which most of the information in this article regarding the program
has been obtained. The brochure and applications to the MAP can be obtained from licensed
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untary effort of the insurance industry but is subject to the supervi-
sion of the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner. The Pennsylvania
MAP was established specifically to aid municipalities, dram shops
and daycare centers in obtaining general liability coverage. Other
commercial liability risks may be placed through the MAP on a
case-by-case basis as agreed to by the MAP and the Insurance
Department."'
Applications to the Pennsylvania MAP must be submitted by
licensed agents or brokers along with a non-refundable application
fee of $250. The Pennsylvania MAP is not, itself, an insurance com-
pany capable of assuming risk and does not guarantee the applicant
issuance of an insurance policy.
The Pennsylvania MAP operates through three committees: an
executive committee, a producer committee, and an underwriting
committee. The members of each committee are appointed by the
Insurance Commissioner. The executive committee oversees the ac-
tivities of the other two committees and has responsibility for the
overall operation of the MAP.1 ' The producer committee is respon-
sible for reviewing the application and determining whether coverage
can be obtained on the open market. The most recent carrier of the
applicant is contacted and an effort made to convince that carrier to
continue coverage. Thereafter, other carriers writing the type of in-
surance will be contacted and an effort made to place the risk. At a
minimum, the producer committee seeks a temporary carrier to al-
low the MAP to continue to explore the market and acquire under-
writing data. The underwriting committee takes over when the ef-
forts of the producer committee fail.
The underwriting committee uses a lottery system to make
placement of applicants from among the master list of insurers and
eligible surplus lines insurers who have agreed to participate in the
MAP. The application is referred to the first five insurers on the
master list and if no quote is received from those five, the next five
insurers on the list receive the application and so on until the list is
agents, brokers and surplus line agents as well as from the insurance industry trade associa-
tions including the Insurance Federation of Pennsylvania, the Professional Insurance Agents
Association, the Pennsylvania Association of Independent Insurance Agents, the Pennsylvania
Association of Mutual Insurance Companies and the Pennsylvania Surplus Lines Association.
I 1. A notable exception from the Pennsyvlania MAP's assistance is the placement of
risks with a pollution exposure. The MAP will not take applications from persons seeking
environmental impairment liability coverage.
112. The executive committee established the rules and procedures for the operation of
the MAP as a whole and each of its committees. The executive committee submits a monthly
report to the Insurance Commissioner, which includes a certification of all risks for which the
MAP is unable to find placement.
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exhuasted or a quote obtained. Participating companies agree to
make a quote on at least one of every five applications. Each partici-
pant retains the authority to evaluate the risk and develop the appro-
priate price. The applicant's agent is notified of quotations, and then
the agent will complete the placement of insurance with the particu-
lar company if the applicant accepts coverage at the quoted price. If
the underwriting committee cannot obtain a quote, the application is
thereafter submitted to the executive committee which makes a final
attempt to place coverage. If it is unsuccessful, it notifies the execu-
tive committee which sends a letter to the agent with an explanation
of the efforts made to obtain coverage and the results.
The Pennsylvania Market Assistance Program is a temporary
program intended to assist in the placement of risks only so long as it
is required by market conditions. It does not provide assistance to
those risks which can obtain insurance but only at a premium many
times greater than previously experienced.
B. Statutory Facilities for the Placement of Insurance
The legislature has established statutory facilities for the place-
ment of certain lines of insurance. Unlike the Pennsylvania MAP,
these facilities guarantee the placement of a risk. They were estab-
lished to provide certain kinds of insurance either directly as an in-
surance company or indirectly through placement with a private in-
surer required to participate.
The Pennsylvania Fair Plan Act'18 was passed to "encourage
stability in the property insurance market for property located in ur-
ban areas of this Commonwealth."" 4 It provides insurance "against
direct loss to real or tangible personal property at a fixed location" 11
caused by vandalism, fire or theft. The Fair Plan provides coverage
on both residential and commercial property. The typical multi-peril
homeowners policy provides the homeowner with liability coverage
for judgments arising out of the maintenance and use of the property
as well as coverage for property loss."" The Fair Plan does not pro-
113. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1600.101-.502 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1986).
114. Id. § 1006.102.
115. Id. § 1600.103.
116. The homeowners' policy provides a package of coverages including losses to real
and personal property and coverage for the insureds' liability arising out of the insured prop-
erty. I CoucH ON INSURANCE 2D § 1:61, at 152 (rev. ed. 1984). Allowing one company to
issue more than one line of insurance, and then more than one line of coverage in one policy
was at one time a revolutionary idea. Amendments to the Insurance Company Law of 1921,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 382(e), (f) (Purdon 1971), made multi-line insurance possible in
Pennsylvania.
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vide liability coverage although by statute the plan is empowered to
issue "such other classes of insurance as may be determined by the
Industry Placement Facility with the approval of the Commissioner,
but shall not include insurance on motor vehicles, farm or such man-
ufacturing risks as may be excluded by the Commissioner."' 17 The
Fair Plan has never opted to include liability insurance in the pack-
age of insurance coverage it provides.
The Fair Plan operates as an insurance company. 1 8 It makes its
own rate filings and issues its own policy forms. To the extent the
Plan is unable to meet its financial obligations, shortages can be
made up by assessment from the participating insurers,119 which are
all insurers authorized to write basic property insurance or any com-
ponent contained in a multi-peril policy.
120
The Assigned Risk Plan was established to provide motor vehi-
cle liability insurance to applicants "who are entitled to, but are una-
ble to, procure insurance through ordinary methods. 1 21 It does not
operate as a direct carrier but, rather, distributes risks among all
motor vehicle liability insurers doing business in the Common-
wealth. 2 These assignments are based on the insurer's share of the
voluntary market as determined by the insurer's premium volume.1 3
The Plan provides commercial insurance on every type of motor ve-
hicle including trucks, school buses and taxicabs. Liability insurance
as well as the first-party benefits required by statute are available
from the Plan. 2
The State Workmen's Insurance Fund was created to insure
employers against liability for payment of workers' compensation
benefits to employees injured by accident or disease.12 Its operation
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1600.103(2) (Purdon 1971).
118. The constitution and by-laws of the Insurance Placement Facility of Pennsylvania
are approved by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department where they are on deposit for public
inspection. Id. § 1600.205(b).
119. See Article IX of the constitution of the Insurance Placement Facility of Pennsyl-
vania; id. § 1600.201(f).
120. Id. § 1600.201(a).
121. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1741 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
122. Id. Participation in the Assigned Risk Plan is mandatory for all insurers writing
motor vehicle insurance in the voluntary market.
123. See Foremost Ins. Co. v. Insurance Dep't of Pa., 82 Pa. Commw. 1, 474 A.2d 396
(1984), aFd per curiam, 507 Pa. 556, 492 A.2d 1118 (1985), Rockwood Ins. Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania Auto Ins. Plan, - Pa. Commw. - , 508 A.2d 1266, affid per curiam - Pa.
-, 518 A.2d 265 (1986) (wherein the court describes the system for distributing risks).
124. The mandatory first-party benefits include a medical benefit, income loss benefit
and a funeral benefit. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1711 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The mandatory
liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage is specified in 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1702 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
125. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 201-325 (Purdon 1952 and Supp. 1986).
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is directed by a board consisting of the Secretary of Labor and In-
dustry, the Insurance Commissioner and the State Treasurer.126
Other statutory facilities operate under the immediate direction of
the insurance industry which is in turn subject to supervision of the
Insurance Department. 27 By contrast, the State Workmen's Insur-
ance Fund functions as a state-owned insurance company, although
one financied through the payment of premium by employers - as
opposed to appropriation from the General Fund. 28 In the voluntary
market, workers' compensation insurance is sold to an employer
along with a commercial general liability insurance policy that pro-
vides complete coverage to the entire operation of a business or ser-
vice enterprise. Nevertheless, the applicable statute limits coverage
from the State Workmen's Insurance Fund to workers' compensation
insurance and does not give the Board discretion to expand the scope
of its mandate to general liability insurance. 29
As in other lines where insurance has been mandated, the Penn-
sylvania legislature established a facility 30 for guaranteeing the
availability of medical malpractice insurance when such insurance
became a condition of licensure for health care providers."' The
Joint Underwriting Association operates as an insurance company
that makes its own rate and form filings. Its deficits are made up by
payment from the Catastrophic Loss Trust Fund."3 2 The association
follows the Assigned Risk Plan model in that its organization and
administration is conducted by insurers but regulated by the Insur-
ance Department. 33
As in Pennsylvania, many states have established joint under-
writing associations to provide insurance in lines where capacity is
particularly tight, such as medical malpractice insurance. 4 In the
wake of the liability insurance crisis, some state legislatures ex-
panded the scope of the enabling legislation to authorize the writing
of additional lines such as liquor liability 3 5 and day care centers. 3 6
A few states have passed legislation to enable joint underwriting as-
126. Id. § 211.
127. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1600.102, 1600.205(b) (Purdon 1971).
128. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 241, 242 (Purdon 1952).
129. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1600.103(2) (Purdon 1971).
130. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40 §§ 1301.801-.811 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
131. Id. § 1301.701.
132. Id. § 1301.803(b).
133. Id. § 1301.803(a).
134. See. e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 5502 (McKinney 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3929.71 (Baldwin 1986).
135. MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN., ch. 175A, § 5A (West 1986).
136. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.90.010-90.170 (1986).
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sociations to write any type of commercial general liability insur-
ance.13 7 The North Carolina legislature gave its Insurance Commis-
sioner a broad grant of discretion and power to establish a plan to
provide insurance whenever the Commissioner determines such a
plan is required by market conditions.' 38 Such stand-by authority to
establish joint underwriting associations eliminates the piecemeal ap-
proach to the establishment of statutory facilities.
The Pennsylvania legislature has established statutory facilities
to provide a market in those lines where insurance is deemed critical:
medical malpractice insurance, property insurance in urban areas,
motor vehicle insurance and workers' compensation insurance. Gen-
erally, statutory facilities do not find favor with the insurance indus-
try because deficits are made up by direct or indirect contribution
from insurers in the voluntary market. 3 9 Should the Pennsylvania
legislature decide a market is needed in other lines, it has the choice
of expanding the activities of the already existing facilities or estab-
lishing a new facility to provide that insurance.
C. Pools and Reciprocal Insurance Exchanges
As noted, self-insurance can be an acceptable method to provide
protection against liability judgments. In the capacity crunch, alter-
natives such as "self-insurance pools" developed."10 There are, how-
ever, important distinctions between self-insurance, a pool and an in-
surance company required to be licensed and regulated.
A pooling mechanism is fundamentally inconsistent with the
concept of self-insurance. Insurance is by definition a mechanism
whereby risk is transferred and shared between members of a
group."' In self-insurance, there is a single insured and, thus, no
risk-sharing. Where the risk of each individual member is trans-
ferred to a pool which assumes that risk and undertakes to indem-
nify its members for any losses, an insurance mechanism exists.
From time to time, the courts have occasion to rule on the question
137. NEV. REV. STAT. § 686B.180 (1985).
138. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-450 (1986).
139. The Pennsylvania Joint Underwriting Association is unusual in that deficits are
made up by contribution from the Medical Professional Catastrophe Loss Fund. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.803(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986). This funding is obtained by payment from
health care providers. Id. § 1301.701(e). Accordingly, deficits of the Joint Underwriting Asso-
ciation are made up by payments of insureds (i.e. health care providers) rather than by insur-
ers in the voluntary market.
140. FLE rCHER, Public Entities Plunge into Self-Insurance Pools, 19 Bus. INs. 3 (July
15, 1985); FINDLAY, Can A Liability Pool Work?, 86 BEST'S REV. (PROP./CASUALTY INS. ED.)
106 (April 1986).
141. I COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 1.3 (Rev. ed. 1984).
INSURANCE CRISIS
of what is the business of insurance. In Union Labor Life Insurance
Company v. Pireno,42 the United States Supreme Court identified
several criteria by which to judge whether an activity was insurance.
These criteria were described as follows: "[F]irst, whether the prac-
tice has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's risk;
second, whether the practice is an integral part of the policy rela-
tionship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the
practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry." '143 In
Group Life and Health Insurance Company v. Royal Drug Com-
pany, 44 the Supreme Court was even more emphatic on the relation-
ship between "insurance" and risk-sharing holding that the most im-
portant criterion by which to determine whether an activity is
"insurance" is whether it involves the transfer and spreading of risk.
State law is generally consistent with the conclusions reached by
the Supreme Court. Although Pennsylvania statutes do not contain
an express definition of "insurance," the legislature has at least im-
plicitly recognized that pooling of risks is insurance. The Judicial
Code authorizes municipalities to pool their public liability insurance
risks through contracts and grants these pools an exemption from
insurance regulation.""5 The statute also authorizes municipalities to
self-insure against liability risk.14 6 From the Judicial Code, it is clear
that, first, self-insurance and pooling are not synonymous concepts,
and, second, a mechanism which pools liability risks will be subject
to insurance regulatory laws absent an express authorization and ex-
emption by the legislature.
In Pennsylvania, except for municipalities, the pool is not a law-
ful alternative to the insurer/insured relationship. To the extent that
the goal of a pool is to provide a way for a group of insureds with a
similar liability risk to insure one another, an alternative that is at-
tractive and lawful is the reciprocal insurance exchange.
Reciprocal insurance is also known as inter-insurance or inter-
indemnity.1 47 It is a system whereby individuals, partnerships and
corporations engaged in a similar line of business agree to indemnify
each other in the event of a member's loss. This is achieved through
a single and common attorney in fact for each of the members who
is appointed for the purpose of exchanging insurance contracts that
142. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
143. Id. at 129.
144. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
145. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8564(d) (Purdon 1982).
146. Id. § 8564(e).
147. See 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 18:11, at 613 (rev. ed 1984).
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make each member both an insured and an insurer." 8 The reciprocal
exchange is very similar to the underwriting exchange, such as
Lloyds of London, and to the mutual insurance company. At Lloyds,
underwriters are insurers only and write insurance not just for its
members but for the entire market. The mutual insurance company
is one owned by is policyholders; the liability is joint and several
whereas the liability of a reciprocal exchange is separate and
several.14 9
In some states, reciprocal exchanges are expressly excluded
from insurance regulatory statutes.150 In Pennsylvania, it is the re-
verse. Reciprocal and inter-insurance exchanges must be licensed,"'1
and are deemed to be "persons" in the business of insurance.1
52
Their activities, from policy forms"'5 to rates, 5 are subject to the
same panoply of regulation as those of insurance entities. They offer
their insureds the same protections of any licensed insurance com-
pany; principal among them is guaranty fund protection in the event
of insolvency.1
55
The capital and surplus requirements of a reciprocal exchange
are approximately the equivalent of a mutual insurance company. 156
An exchange is easier to establish because there is no requirement
that the exchange be incorporated as there is for the mutual or stock
insurance company. 15 7 The additional attraction of the reciprocal ex-
148. Id.
149. Id. In a general sense a captive insurance company is like a mutual or reciprocal
exchange in that its insureds are its owners. It differs in that its coverage can only be marketed
to the members of the association which owns the company. Four states have specific statutes
authorizing the establishment and regulation of captive insurance companies. See, Colorado
Captive Insurance Company Act, COLO. STAT. ANN. 10-6-101 to 10-6-130; DELA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§6901-6917; TENN. STAT. ANN. 56-13-102 to 56-13-131; VERMONT STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§§6001-6016.
150. Id. at § 18.13, at 617; see, e.g., Gisin v. Farmers Auto. Inter-Insurance Exchange,
219 Iowa 1373, 261 N.W. 618 (1934).
151. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 961-971 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1986) for the general
statutory chapter authorizing and regulating reciprocal exchanges. Licensing is required at id.
§ 965.
152. For purposes of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act, a "person" doing the business
of insurance is defined to include "reciprocal exchange" and "inter-insurer." Id. § 1171.3.
153. Section 354 of the Insurance Company Law of 1921 requires "any ... exchange"
doing business in Pennsylvania to obtain approval of policy from forms prior to use. Id. §
477(b).
154. For example, section 2 of the Casualty and Surety Rate Regulatory Act, has ex-
press application to "exchanges." Id. § 1182.
155. The Pennsylvania Insurance Guaranty Association was established to provide pay-
ment under property and casualty insurance policies. PA. STAT. ANN. § 1701.101-.605 (Purdon
1971). The Act has express application to exchanges. Id. § 1701.103(2).
156. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 386(c), (e), 964(d) (Purdon 1971). Depending on
the kind of property and casualty insurance written, capital and surplus in excess of the statu-
tory minimum will be required before the exchange or mutual can be licensed.
157. Id. § 101. Incorporation for mutual companies writing property and casualty insur-
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change is the perception that insureds have greater control over their
insurance company than is possible for policyholders of a stock or
mutual company. In any case, the establishment of a licensed insur-
ance company, Whatever the entity, will remain the only lawful way
in Pennsylvania for persons to pool and share risks at least until the
legislature decides to amend the Judicial Code to extend authoriza-
tion for unlicensed, unregulated insurance pools beyond
municipalities.
D. The Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986
The Product Liability Risk Retention Act of 1981 was passed
by Congress to give relief to manufacturers who were unable to ob-
tain products liability insurance by allowing manufacturers to organ-
ize groups for the purchase of, or pooling to provide, product liability
insurance. 1 On October 27, 1986, the Risk Retention Amendments
of 1986 were signed into law'59 which expanded the scope of the
federal law to any kind of liability insurance.6 0 In so doing, Con-
gress placed certain limitations on the use of risk retention and
purchasing groups. The Act grants a broad exemption from state
regulation to qualified groups."6
A risk retention group must be chartered and licensed as a lia-
bility insurance company under the laws of one of the fifty states.'62
Each of the members of the group must become an owner of the
company,'18 and all owners must be provided liability insurance by
the group. The members of the group are required to be engaged in
a related trade, business or service industry.6 4 The group is limited
to one line of insurance, to wit liability insurance, although it may
ance requires that the company hold applications for two hundred separate risks. Id. §
386(e)(I). By contrast, the exchange seeking to be licensed is only required to have one hun-
dred such applications. Id. § 964(0.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 3901 (1983). For legislative history and purpose see 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1432.
159. Risk Retention Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-563, 100 Stat. 5016 (1987)
(to amend 15 U.S.C. § 3901-09).
160. Section 2(a)(2) of the Act defines "Liability" as "legal liability for damages (in-
cluding costs of defense, legal costs and fees, and other claims expenses) because of injuries to
other persons, damage to their property, or other damage or loss to such other persons result-
ing from or arising out of (i) any business . . . or (ii) any activity of any state or local govern-
ment. ... Id. at § 2(a).
161. See id. §§ 3(a), 4(a).
162. See id. §§ 2(4)(c)(i), 3(a)(I). If a risk retention group qualifies under the "grand-
father provision" of subsection (c)(ii) of section 2, it may continue to provide product liability
coverage.
163. Id. § 2(4)(E)(i). The risk retention group is not to be used as an investment oppor-
tunity by third persons who are not covered by the group.
164. Id. § 2(4)(F).
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provide reinsurance to other groups with a similar membership. 65
The chartering state may apply the full range of its insurance laws
to the domiciliary risk retention group. The authority of non-domicil-
iary states is far more limited.
A purchasing group can be organized and domiciled in any state
to purchase liability insurance for the members of its group. 6 Its
members must have common "business, trade, product, service[s],
premises or operations"' 6 7 that relate their exposure to liability risk.
The purchasing group is exempt from direct state regulation and
from laws prohibiting insurers to provide liability insurance on a
group basis. 68 In other respects, the insurer providing insurance to
the purchasing group is subject to state law. Purchasing groups must
register with the state insurance commissioner in every state in
which it does business. 69
The Risk Retention Amendments of 1986 contain provisions
designed to give states some regulatory control which, in general, is
greater for risk retention groups than for risk purchasing groups. A
risk retention group may be subject to a financial examination by the
state insurance commissioner in any state where the group does busi-
ness if the Commissioner in the chartering state had not done one or
has refused to initiate a financial examination. ° In any case, where
the risk rentention or risk purchasing group has failed to effect an
exemption from state law through proper compliance with the fed-
eral law, the state is authorized to apply state law and to seek in-
junctive relief from a federal or state of competent jurisdiction. 7 1
Further, a risk retention group may not include insurance companies
among its members lest otherwise fully regulated companies would
seek to use the Risk Retention Act to escape state laws. 72 Risk re-
tention groups can be required to comply with laws relating to unfair
claim settlement practices,7 to participate in statutory insurance fa-
cilities, 17 and to pay premium taxes. 75 Risk retention groups must
165. Id. § 2(4)(G).
166. Id. § 2(5)(A)-(D).
167. Id. § 2(5)(C).
168. Id. § 4(a).
169. Id. § 4(d)(1).
170. Id. § 3(a)(l)(E); in addition, a state insurance commissioner is authorized to ob-
tain injunctive relief where a risk retention group is believed to be in a hazardous financial
condition or is financially impaired. § 3(a)(l)(H).
171. Id. 99 3(")(1), (2), 4(g) and (h).
172. Id. § 3(h).
173. Id. § 3(a)(l)(A).
174. Id. § 3(a)(1)(B).
175. Id. § 3(a)(1)(C).
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also give notice to members of the insurance policy that the group is
not subject to state supervision and that the policy is not backed by
the state's guaranty fund in thp. event of insolvency.17 6 Finally, the
states retain the authority to establish criteria for mandatory insur-
ance. This means, for example, that Pennsylvania could refuse to li-
cense health care providers that obtained liability through a risk re-
tention or risk purchasing group.
17
The provisions of the Risk Retention Amendments of 1986 per-
mitting regulation by states are not self-executing but, for the most
part, require enactment of legislation by states that wish to regulate
within the boundaries established by Congress. The National Associ-
ation of Insurance Commissioners has designed a model risk reten-
tion act which is a package of those regulatory provisions authorized
by the federal act.17 8 To the extent states enact the model act or
some version of it, they will be able to provide some protection to
consumers in their state that choose to obtain their insurance from a
risk retention group.
VI. Conclusion
The primary goal of regulatory efforts taken in the wake of the
liability insurance crisis has been to improve the availability of insur-
ance. The requirements of sixty days advance notice of termination
and prompt return of unearned premium give the insured an ade-
quate opportunity and means to obtain replacement coverage. The
Market Assistance Program can provide the mechanism by which
the insured finds that replacement coverage in the volutarty market.
Statutory facilities, such as a joint underwriting association, can be
the source of insurance when there is no voluntary market. While
these efforts may advance the needs of consumers looking for a pol-
icy, they do not address the problem of affordability and if the cover-
age offered is not affordable, it is not available.
Making liability insurance affordable is a more challenging and
complex problem than trying to make it available. The amount of
premium used to pay agent's commission, fees, taxes and other com-
pany expenses usually remain constant. The majority of the pre-
mium dollar goes to the payment of losses, which have not remained
constant. As noted earlier, it is hotly debated whether the losses
176. Id. § 3(a)(I)(I).
177. Id. §§ 6(a) and (d).
178. The NAIC Model Risk Retention Act was adopted at the December 1986, meeting
of the NAIC in Orlando, Florida.
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demonstrate a need for tort reform. 1 9 Liability losses may simply
demonstrate the need to improve safety and to reduce risks present
in our society.
Alternate insurance delivery systems will not in themselves
make insurance affordable to their members. To keep premiums low,
these groups will have to do a careful initial underwriting of the risks
accepted and require their members to establish risk management
programs. In other words, these alternative insurance mechanisms
will have to act like insurance companies. To the extent such steps
are not taken, low premiums will be inadequate and will result in
insolvencies to the detriment of the members as well as the third-
party claimants.
No panacea to the liability insurance crisis has been discovered
although regulators will continue the search. An advantage to the
state system of insurance regulation is the range of experimentation
it allows. Each state becomes a laboratory in which different re-
sponses to the liability insurance crisis can be evaluated and tested;
the successes can be exported to other states. The challenge to regu-
lators as they fashion these solutions is to strike a balanced ap-
proach. Otherwise, they may find capacity in their state further di-
minished as private insurers withdraw from over-regulated markets.
179. The NAIC has endorsed a study planned by Insurance Services Office to research
claim costs in relation to changes in the tort system. NAIC Approves Study to Evaluate Ef-
fects of Tort Reform on Claims' Costs, 4 NAIC News I (January 1987). The study is not
expected to be completed before 1989 and is intended to assist regulators in identifying those
tort reforms that can be translated into increased capacity for certain risks.
